We examine the monitoring benefits of institutional ownership on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first provide a model in which institutional investors monitor managers, mitigate agency costs, and influence corporate decisions on the SEO plans. Our theory generates some new testable predictions that firms with larger institutional holdings (1) have better SEO outcomes, (2) tend to issue a smaller size of equity, and (3) are more likely to complete announced SEO deals. We then test these predictions based on a large US SEO sample from 1980 to 2004, and find strong supportive evidence.
Introduction
Institutional investors are one of the major investor groups in the United States. By the end of 2004, they owned more than 50% of U.S. equities (Chen et al. (2007) ). How institutional investors affect corporate financial policies and, consequently, corporate value has become an important question for both academics and practitioners. Although previous studies have examined this question from various aspects such as acquisitions, executive compensation and payout policy 1 , the importance of institutional holding in monitoring corporate management is still inconclusive. In this paper, we investigate another aspect of this interesting question: the relation between institutional holding and seasoned equity offerings (SEO) decisions.
This article investigates the monitoring role of institutional investors on SEO. In our theoretical framework, a firm is managed by an executive with empire-building preference, and it is owned by one large shareholder as well as a number of diffused small investors. When facing an investment opportunity, the manager can make a SEO deal to raise capital. Due to her empire-building preference, she tends to issue more equity than the optimal level that maximizes shareholders value. Investors could exert costly monitoring efforts to assure that the manager makes the optimal financing and investment decisions. Each of the firm's shareholders faces a free-rider problem because the monitoring shareholder bears the costs of monitoring alone, whereas all the shareholders benefit from her effort. When every shareholder is just holding a small amount of shares, the benefit from improving firm performance cannot outweigh the cost of monitoring. In this case, no one will make the monitoring effort. The monitoring may occur only when a certain investor is holding a large stake in the firm's equity.
1 See Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Chen et al. (2007) , Hartzell and Starks (2003) , and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) .
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In equilibrium, the ownership of large shareholders shapes the SEO characteristics by mitigating agency problems. In particular, our model predicts that the ownership of large shareholders is associated with (1) strong SEO outcomes, (2) small size of equity offerings, and (3) high likelihood of completing announced SEO plans.
Based on a large set of US SEO data from 1980 to 2004, we provide strong empirical evidence supporting the above predictions. First of all, we examine the impact of institutional ownership on SEO outcomes. Consistent with our prediction, SEO firms with higher institutional ownership experience higher abnormal returns at SEO announcements, and higher stock and accounting performance during three years following the SEO deals. We then examine the relation between the size of the SEO and institutional ownership. Consistent with our model, institutional ownership is negatively related with the size of the SEO. This evidence suggests that firms, which benefit from strong monitoring carried out by institutional investors, successfully reduce agency costs and avoid raising too much money from SEO transactions.
Finally, providing further support to our model, we find that the likelihood of completing SEO plans increases with institutional ownership.
SEOs are a very visible and important activity in the life of a firm and are a powerful way of examining shareholder control. In the SEO process, shareholder approval is necessary before an offering can occur. It is essential to get prior shareholder authorization of any shares that will be issued. This article sheds lights on the SEO decisions from a new angle: agency problem. Our examination on SEO characteristics is based on managerial agency conflicts. Existing explanations on SEO decisions are mainly based on adverse selection models (e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Lucas and McDonald (1990) ) or "windows-of-opportunity" models (e.g.
4 Daniel et al. (1998) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) ). Very few papers have investigated how manager-shareholder agency problem influences equity issuance decisions. Our paper identifies strong shareholder control as an important determinant for SEO features. Moreover, this article also helps to better understand the role of institutional investors in influencing corporate policies by diminishing the agency cost of shareholder-manager conflicts.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related studies and locate where our paper stands among the existing literature. Section 3 presents the model and provides empirical implications. In Section 4, we describe the data source and sample selection. Section 5 reports the empirical results. In Section 6, we check the robustness of our study and discuss some alternative explanation. Finally, Section 7 concludes. Proofs of the propositions are included in the appendix.
Related Literature
This paper relates primarily to two major areas of corporate finance literature: the role of institutional investors and corporate SEO decisions.
Numerous studies such as Carleton et al. (1998 ), Hartzell and Starks (2003 ), and Gillan and Starks (2000 , have suggested that institutional investors play an effective and vital role in corporate governance. Institutional ownership in the firm improves shareholders value by reducing agency conflicts through either a direct mechanism such as public targeting, through filing of shareholders proposals, or indirectly without coming to the shareholders vote.
Consistent with this literature, our model and empirical results provide a systematic view on 5 how monitoring by institutional investors could decrease agency costs and benefit shareholders in an important corporate event such as a SEO deal.
We also relate to the literature on SEO decisions. Studies such as Asquith and Mullins (1986) , Masulis and Korwar (1986) , Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) , Eckbo et al. (2006) and Ritter (2003) all report negative announcement abnormal returns relative to the market benchmark. Moreover, Ritter (2003) reports five-year post-issuance abnormal returns of about -30% relative to the market benchmark. McLaughlin et al. (1996) and Lee (1997) suggest that free cash flow problems after issues may play an important role in explaining the underperformance of issuing firms. Supporting the latter results, our model and empirical findings show that reducing the agency costs of managerial conflicts through shareholder monitoring, would result in stronger short-run and long-run performance for the issuing firms. Clarke et al. (2001) , Mikkelson and Partch (1988), and Giammarino et al. (2004) provide some empirical examination on withdrawn security offerings. These papers focus on information asymmetry between investors and managers, and insider trading. However, they are silent about the manager-shareholder agency problems. Our paper provides an alternative explanation to what determines SEO withdrawal, based on agency theory and the monitoring role of institutional investors.
Other studies such as Gibson et al. (2004) and Chemmanur et al. (2006) have an unbiased estimation of the project, and they accept it when the perceived net present value (NPV) is positive. The manager goes ahead to issue the equity when shareholders approve the plan, and withdraw when shareholders reject it. Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of the model.
Analysis of the model
The probability that the shareholder accepts the project is given by
When the shareholder fails to intervene, the manager's problem is given by
When the shareholder succeeds to intervene, she faces the problem given by
Obviously,
FB
I is the solution for Equation (3). In other words, the shareholder will choose the first-best investment when they intervene successfully. We define the second-best investment SB I as the solution to Equation (2). Proof: See the Appendix.
Shareholders' decision on whether to intervene is given by
Probability of successful interference by the shareholder, e, is equal to the shareholder's effort.
Therefore, with probability e she successfully intervenes and makes the first-best investment (the first term of Equation (4)). With probability 1 e  , she fails to intervene and the manager makes the second-best investment (the second term). The shareholder herself bears the cost of intervening (the third terms). The cost of intervening is convex in effort e. The first-order condition implies
The economic intuition obtained from Equation (5) is straightforward. The shareholder will exert more effort to intervene when she is holding a large proportion of the firm's shares (when  is large) or when deviating from first-best investment is considerably costly (when the difference between [ ( ) ] and [ ( ) ]
The analysis above yields the three propositions below.
Proposition 1. A firm with larger institutional ownership,
 , is more likely to make the first-best investment decision.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2. A firm with larger institutional ownership,
 , is more likely to complete announced SEO decisions.
Proposition 3. Larger institutional ownership leads to better outcomes from the SEO deals.
The economic intuition behind the above three propositions is as follows. The empire-building manager receives private benefits by over-raising capital. The SEO proceeds, which the manager would like to raise (second-best investment level), is always more than the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholders value. When investors are able to monitor/intervene managerial decisions, the probability of a successful intervene increases with institutional ownership, leading to more realized states of the world where the first best investments are implemented. In short, the monitoring would affect the SEO decisions by assuring the first-best amount of capital to be raised. In the end, higher institutional ownership leads to better outcomes for SEO deals.
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Note that the first-best investment is characterized with a smaller size and better outcome relative to the second-best investment. 
Sample Selection and Data Description
We obtain data from multiple sources. Data on SEO deals are obtained from the Thompson Like Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) , our key independent variable is Top5holding, which is the proportion of the institutional ownership by the top five 11 institutional investors in the firm (i.e. the summation of the shares owned by the top five institutional investors deflated by the firm's total shares outstanding). As robustness check, we also measure institutional ownership using the stock ownership by all the institutional investors or using the Herfindahl index of institutional ownership concentration or using the ownership of the largest reporting institutional investor. Our results are not sensitive to these alternative measures.
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We measure book value of equity as the sum of the common equity value (Item 60) and deferred tax (Item 74). Market value of equity is defined as common shares outstanding (Item 25) times fiscal year closing price (Item 199). Firm size is computed as the natural logarithm of firms' sales (Item 12). Return on equity (ROE) is measured as the ratio of operation income before depreciation (Item 13) over book value of equity. We compute Leverage as the ratio of long-term debt (Item 9) and current debt (Item 34) over total assets. Asset-Liquidity is measured as the ratio of cash and short-term investment (Item 1) plus receivables (Item 2) over total assets. We measure M/B ratio as the ratio of market value of equity over book equity value. Capital Expenditure is the firm's capital expenditure (Item 128) normalized by total assets. All of the variables are measured at the fiscal yearend prior to the SEO announcements.
To measure the SEO outcomes, we adopt three different variables. The first measure is the issuer's abnormal return over days (-1,1), where day 0 is the SEO announcement day (CAR3).
Daily abnormal returns are computed using the market model and the value-weighted CRSP index. The estimation window includes days (-200, -60) prior to the announcement date. We further complement the stock price reaction with the post-SEO accounting performance. We 12 compute the average industry-adjusted ROE over three years after SEO. In particular, we calculate the median industry-level ROE of each Fama-French 48 industries, and subtract those industry-level ROE from the SEO firms' ROE.
As the third measure for SEO outcome, we calculate the post-SEO long-run stock performance.
Following Barber and Lyon (1997) and Barber et al. (1999) , we use control firms on size, book-to-market ratio, and prior-year stock return as the benchmark for post-SEO stock performance. Barber and Lyon (1997) report that the control firm approach eliminates the skewness bias associated with the long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and yields well-specified statistics. Using Barber et al. (1999) 's method, we sort the population of NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms into 14 size groups and 10 book-to-market groups. After determining which of the 140 groups the SEO firm is in at the month-end prior to the issuance date, we choose from the group the control firm that is the closest match on prior-year stock return and is not involved in any SEO events. Then, three-year buy-and-hold returns (starting from the month after the equity issuance) are computed for the sample firms and control firms. At last, the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns are the difference between sample firm returns and corresponding contemporaneous returns of control firms (BHAR3). All of the dollar-value variables in our sample are measured in 2000-constant dollars. To ensure some outliers in the data are not driving our results, we winsorize all the continuous variables at one percent tails.
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Empirical Results

Institutional Holding and SEO Outcome
Our tests on the relation between institutional ownership and SEO outcomes are based on the following equation, using the following cross-sectional OLS regression model: 
where i indexes firms. The dependent variable is the SEO outcome, measured by CAR3, BHAR3
and ROE3. The sample for this regression analysis consists of only those completed SEO deals. 
According to Prediction 2, we expect the coefficient 1  to be negative.
[Insert Table 3]
The sample for this regression analysis consists of only those completed SEO deals. Table 3 highlights that Top5holding is significantly negatively associated with the SEO size. The dependent variables in this table are three different measures of the size of equity issuance. The independent variables include the measure of institutional ownership, as well as control variables. In Model (1), the explained variable is the proceeds raised in the SEO deal (in millions). The coefficient of Top5holding is -60.8 and is significant at the 1% level. This result implies $6.7 million reduction in proceeds when Top5holding increases by one standard deviation, comparing to the median proceeds of $53 million.
We normalize proceeds by the firm's total asset (measured in percentage) in Regression (2).
The variable Top5holding has a negative coefficient of -6.92 which is significant at the 5% level. As another alternative specification, we deflate proceeds by the firm's market value of equity (measured in percentage) in Regression (3). 
Institutional Holding and the Likelihood of SEO Completion
We use logit regression to test whether firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to complete the SEO deals. Specifically, we estimate the following model: Based on Prediction 3, the coefficient on Top5holding is expected to be positive.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
The regression results are reported in Table 4 , where the coefficients are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability when all of the other independent variables are at their mean value. Table 4 indicates that the probability of deal completion increases with institutional ownership.
In Model (1), we include Top5holding as well as industry and year dummies as the independent variables. The coefficient on Top5holding is 0.082 and is significant at the 1% 17 level. This result implies that an increase of Top5holding from mean by one standard deviation is expected to increase the probability of deal completion by about 0.88 percentage points.
In Model (2), we include CAR3, FirmSize, PastReturn, ROE, M/B, Asset-liquidity, and
Capital Expenditure as additional control variables. The coefficient of Top5holding is 0.053
and is significant at the 1% level. The variable CAR3 also attracts a significantly positive coefficient, indicating that the deal is more likely to be completed if the market favors it. In
Model (3), we add an interaction term, Top5holding×CAR3. The coefficient on this interaction is significantly positive, indicating that firms with high institutional ownership are more likely complete the SEO deals that the market is in favor of.
Robustness Check and Alternative Explanation
While our results suggest that institutional investors actively monitor management and enhance corporate performance through SEO decisions, it is still possible that these results are due to endogeneity or other causes for a spurious relation between institutional holding and SEO characteristics. Tables 2-4 by replacing Top5holding with Holdchange.
[Insert Table 5 Here] larger issuance. In Panel C, we also examine how Holdchange influences the deal completion probability; the coefficient on Holdchange is not statistically significant in any of the three regression models.
We have also tried different horizons to compute the change of institutional holding. Instead of the current measure, we use the change of Top5holding from the 3 rd quarter to the 1 st quarter, and the change from the 2 nd and to the 1 st quarters prior to the SEO, respectively. The results are insensitive to the alternative measures. In summary, the stock-picking explanation is not valid.
The relation between good SEO performance and high institutional ownership may be caused by other firm characteristics. To examine this possibility of endogeneity, we conduct a two-stage least squares analysis. Bennett et al. (2003) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) suggest that share turnover and return volatility are reasonable instrumental variables for the institutional ownership. Accordingly, in the first stage, we regress Top5holding on share turnover, stock return volatility (stock return standard deviation from past 36 months), firm size, industry dummies and year dummies. In the second stage, we run an OLS analysis of the SEO outcomes using the fitted values from the first stage regressions as our instrument for
Top5holding. The results, provided in Table 6 , are consistent with our earlier results, suggesting that SEO performance is increasing in institutional ownership.
Conclusion
This paper examines the SEO decisions under the monitoring of institutional investors.
Rather than the adverse selection or "window-of-opportunity" perspectives commonly used in the SEO literature, we investigate the valuation effects of SEO issuance from the agency theory 20 standpoint. The driving force behind our theoretical analysis is that shareholders with large equity ownership tend to monitor management, prevent empire-building managers from raising too much capital, and improve corporate decisions related to SEOs.
Our theory predicts that larger institutional holding is associated with better performance of those SEO firms, smaller size of equity offerings, and higher likelihood of completing announced SEO deals. Based on a large US SEO dataset, we provide strong empirical evidence supporting these predictions. By examining the relation between the change of institutional ownership and SEO characteristics, we rule out the competing explanation that institutional investors are just good at picking better-managed firms rather than improving corporate decisions by monitoring. 
Denote that SB I is the solution for Equation (A1). We already know FB I is the solution to shareholder's maximization problem (i.e., Equation (3)). Substituting . We also know the second-order condition of Equation (2) can be written as 
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof is straightforward. Based on Equation (5), probability of successful intervene, e, is positively related to institutional ownership . Hence, large shareholders have strong incentive to intervene, and thus have higher chance to implement the first-best investment.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
A direct implication of Equation (5) 
Panel B: Sample Firm Characteristics
Proceeds ($million) is the amount of money raised in the SEO deals. Sales ($million) refers to the annual sale volume. Total Asset ($million) is the firm's book value of total asset. MV Equity ($million) refers to the market capitalization of the equity. ROE is the accounting return of equity obtained as the ratio of operation income before depreciation to book equity value. Leverage is the ratio of total debt over total asset. M/B is the ratio of market value of equity over the book value of equity. PastReturn is the annual stock return of the firm. Asset-liquidity is the ratio of the firm's cash, short-term investment plus receivables over total asset. Capital Expenditure is the firm's capital expenditure normalized by total asset. CAR3 is the three-day accumulative abnormal returns over the event windows (-1, 1) around the issuance date (day 0) based on the market model using CRSP value-weighted index returns. The parameters are estimated within (-200, -60) event window relative to the issuance date. BHAR3 is the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the SEO. Matching firms are formed based on size, book-to-market ratio and past-year stock return. ROE3 is the industry-adjusted average ROE over three years after the SEO; it is computed by subtracting the median value of ROE for all firms in the same Fama-French 48 industries. We compute CAR3, BHAR3 and ROE3 based on completed SEO deals. Top5holding is the proportion of the firm's common shares owned by the top five institutional investors. Table 3 , except that we replace Top5holding with Holdchange. The dependent variables are (1) the proceeds of SEO, (2) the proceeds deflated by the firm's total asset, and (3) the proceeds deflated by firm's market value of equity. The table only reports the coefficient of Holdchange; all the controls have almost the same coefficients with those in Table 3 . Corresponding p-values from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. The notation ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Table 4 , except that we replace Top5holding with Holdchange. The dependent variable equals to one if the announced deal is completed and zero otherwise. The coefficients are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability when all of the independent variables are at their mean value. The table only reports the coefficient of Holdchange; all the controls have almost the same coefficients with those in Table 4 . Corresponding p-values from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. The notation ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Model ( 1980 , to December 31, 2004 . The dependent variables are three measures of SEO outcomes. CAR3 is the three-day accumulative abnormal returns over the issuance date. BHAR3 is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over three years after the SEO deal. ROE3 refers to the industry-adjusted average ROE over three years after the SEO. Top5holding is the proportion of the firm's common shares owned by the top five institutional investors. Two instrumental variables are applied: share turnover and stock volatility. In the first stage, we regress Top5holding on share turnover, stock volatility, firm size, year dummies and industry dummies. In the second stage, we regress SEO outcomes on the fitted value of Top5holding from the first stage as well as controls. The notation ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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